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Abstract
Field research reveals that a “worker—lower-level contractor—higher-level contractor” organizational structure has been established in Wuxi City’s manufacturing factories in China, with close connections between workers and team leaders. Local governments are involved in the employment processes of these manufacturing factories but do not intervene in the operations of factories and team contractors with non-standard practices. In light of this field phenomenon, this study starts from the texts of Andrew Walder, comparing the relationships between team contractors and workers in late Qing and Republican China, China’s planned system period, and in factories in the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. This comparison aims to identify the uniqueness of the relationship between team contractors and workers in Wuxi. Furthermore, the study examines the control strategies of local Chinese governments over manufacturing enterprises and labor contractors from the perspective of township enterprises.
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